In traditional crime fighting, making a neighborhood "feel" more secure (more uniformed police, better lighting) actually made it more secure. The perception of security, let's say on the NYC subway systems in the early 90s, drew more non-criminal riders and, like the snowball effect, made the trains safer for everyday straphangers.

In the case of terrorism, the perception of security does far less to help actual security. A safe neighborhood, or "secured area" can be as much a magnet for terrorists as a deterrent -- and unlike the criminal of opportunity, the well-financed groups of martyrs can patiently seek-out and later exploit holes in feel-good policing.

The NYC police commissioner was on Fox news, post the Madrid bombings, being asked about his subway system's security. He spoke about different methods in place, including one where teams of officers boarded trains en masse. The anchor asked how many of these tactics enhanced "real" security and how many were designed to make riders "feel" more secure. The chief answered that the ratio was about 50/50. Today's IHT quotes Fred Pfisterer, a TSA lead screener at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport as saying, "My whole focus as a TSA lead screener is to ensure that the passenger is getting the very best customer service I can give them each and every time, not just once in a while."

With regard to fighting terrorism, is their value in the psychic benefit of "feeling safer" even if there is a tenuous connection to actually being safer?

Terrorism is a tactic, that definitionaly seeks to instill fear. The more terrorism achieves this end, the more it will be viewed as a successful method of attack. Making people feel safer -- through ridiculous TSA screening, swarms of men in blue, video cameras galore -- may on the one hand seem phony, a sham to protect the politicians more than the people; but if the people are made to feel safer, the effect of terror is partially negated. While it may seem like a cop-out (wink, wink) to expend tremendous resources on fighting the effect of terror instead of the cause, this tactic is not totally without merit. It is the result of a compromise between the people's desire for security without any real sacrifices in personal freedom, and it has worked to date.

In the end, though, this approach will prove to be a medium-term panacea that can only provide comfort until it is proven to only provide comfort.