Expand The Possible Outcomes in Iraq

To be Thomas Friedmanian: things don't look good in Iraq. Certainly, though, this is a relative statement. Things don't look good in Iraq compared to the Lucky Charms vision that the administration fed us before the war. But, ok, that was bad expectations management, a classic case of overpromising and underdelivering. But let's say the American people were prepared in advance for an ongoing guerilla war. Let's say that was the benchmark for success. Namely, if success was in just having to deal with a semi-organized, armed, underground resistance and not, for example, an Iranian front, a destabilize Jordan, or a Kurdish who knows what. If that were the case, the administration might be in a very different place right now.

We need to expand our view of the possible outcomes in Iraq and understand that as there were many more potential positive outcomes than the current state, there were many more potential negative outcomes as well.

One can argue that without the Pollyanna vision, the war effort would have never generated momentum. But the administration is now stuck with benchmark it set for itself.